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Abstract. This paper reviews the role of expert judgement to support
reliability assessments within the systems engineering design process.
Generic design processes are described to give the context and a dis-
cussion is given about the nature of the reliability assessments required
in the different systems engineering phases. It is argued that, as far
as meeting reliability requirements is concerned, the whole design pro-
cess is more akin to a statistical control process than to a straight-
forward statistical problem of assessing an unknown distribution. This
leads to features of the expert judgement problem in the design context
which are substantially different from those seen, for example, in risk
assessment. In particular, the role of experts in problem structuring
and in developing failure mitigation options is much more prominent,
and there is a need to take into account the reliability potential for
future mitigation measures downstream in the system life cycle. An
overview is given of the stakeholders typically involved in large scale
systems engineering design projects, and this is used to argue the need
for methods that expose potential judgemental biases in order to gen-
erate analyses that can be said to provide rational consensus about
uncertainties. Finally, a number of key points are developed with the
aim of moving toward a framework that provides a holistic method for
tracking reliability assessment through the design process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Statistics is considered one of the major contrib-
utors to the development of reliability engineering
as a technical discipline [131]. Recent reviews of the
role of statistics within reliability engineering [12,
82, 92, 102] underline the continued need for sta-
tistical science to help engineers assess sources of
uncertainty, design sound data collection systems,
and develop models for combining data and quanti-
fying uncertainty. However it is also recognized that
the role of statistical science within the engineer-
ing process needs to broaden to accommodate the
additional complexities of the technological systems
as well as the operational contexts. One particu-
lar challenge is the need to structure and integrate
statistical modeling within the systems engineering
process to support decision-making aimed at obtain-
ing a sufficient and cost effective state of knowledge
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about future system reliability. This implies that
judgemental, as well as objective, data should be
collected responsibly and used formally.
This paper aims to survey and review the use of
subjective expert judgement methods to assess reli-
ability in the design process. We have deliberately
chosen to interpret the scope of these terms in a
relatively broad fashion. Thus “expert judgement”
refers to any structured method of acquiring knowl-
edge from experts; “reliability” covers the broader
issues of reliability, availability and maintainability
(RAM); and the “design process” is considered to
include within its scope a consideration of how the
system is to be manufactured, how users will in-
teract with it and how it will be maintained. More
specifically, since reliability measures are usually ex-
pressed in probabilistic terms, we consider the use of
expert judgement to structure probabilistic models
and to quantify uncertainties in the development of
a reliable design.
The standard definition of reliability, “the abil-
ity of a system to perform a required function un-
der stated conditions for a stated period of time”
[70], naturally translates into a probability measure.
While empirical reliability can only be properly as-
sessed after a system is in use, there is a need to fore-
cast reliability during the design process to support
analysis aimed at improving reliability. Davis [33]
supported the definition found in [23] that “reliabil-
ity is failure mode avoidance.” We are sympathetic
to this view since identifying and mitigating influ-
ential critical failure modes will cause reliability to
improve. However, we also believe that probabilistic
models have an important role to play in support-
ing design decisions since they allow data integration
and assist prioritization.
Reliability is a recognized element of systems en-
gineering and systems design. However, it is worth
recognizing from the outset how difficult it is to talk
about the reliability of a system. In part the dif-
ficulty has to do with ambiguity of any reliability
metric. In modern systems engineering the practice
of requirements setting should, if carried out well,
result in a coherent set of reliability requirements ex-
pressed in terms of well-defined RAMmetrics. Hence
good engineering-management practice should en-
sure that there is little ambiguity in the expression of
reliability requirements. More difficult though is the
uncertainty around the circumstances under which
those requirements are to be met. The reliability of
a system is ultimately determined by a combination
of factors. Simplistically, we may think of the relia-
bility of a specific system as being determined by the
detailed design reliability as modulated by induced
unreliabilities coming from the manufacturing pro-
cess, from the users, from maintenance and from
modifications. Simplistically, detailed design relia-
bility gives the maximum potential reliability which
manufacturing errors, poor usage and poor mainte-
nance will typically reduce, while changes or mod-
ifications introduced as a result of experience with
the equipment will improve the reliability, that is
overall reliability = designed reliability
− production unreliability
− usage unreliability
−maintenance unreliability
+ changes reliability.
More compactly, we could write a chosen reliability
measure r as
r = r(d, p,u,m, c),
where d, p,u,m and c represent the choices made for
design, production, usage, maintenance and changes.
Inasmuch as systems engineering is about making
trade-offs between different aspects of the system,
the major focus for expert judgement techniques in
support of reliability has to be to explore the be-
havior of, and even quantify, the above conceptual
function in some way.
The existing expert judgement literature is a start-
ing point for elicitation problems in engineering de-
sign, but it needs to be extended to cope with the
unique problems encountered. This is one of the mo-
tivations for the present paper. In discussing the
ways in which expert judgement methods are adopted
to assess uncertainties in the design process we shall
consider both the academic and foundational as-
pects as well as the typical business context so that
we can gain an understanding of why simpler meth-
ods are not replaced in practice by better founded
methods.
The paper is structured as follows. After describ-
ing the systems engineering life cycle phases, we ex-
amine the role of the stakeholders within key mar-
kets and their influence on reliability modeling in-
tentions. Summaries of the existing literature in elic-
itation are woven into a discussion of the issues that
arise during model structuring, instantiation and
updating across the systems engineering process. We
conclude by suggesting areas in need of further re-
search.
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2. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND
DESIGN PHASES
Systems engineering is described in the NASA Sys-
tems Engineering Handbook [132] as
. . . a robust approach to the design, cre-
ation, and operation of systems. In simple
terms, the approach consists of identifi-
cation and quantification of system goals,
creation of alternative system design con-
cepts, performance of design trades, selec-
tion and implementation of the best de-
sign, verification that the design is prop-
erly built and integrated, and post-imple-
mentation assessment of how well the sys-
tem meets (or met) the goals.
Reliability is regarded as an important specialism
that supplies expertise to the systems engineering
process [14, 15]. However, the nature of reliability
knowledge and the demands placed on its practi-
tioners changes considerably through the systems
engineering process. It is therefore useful to consider
the main stages in the design process.
2.1 Life Cycle Phases
The phases described here, based on the most re-
cent international standards [69], are generic, but
descriptions of design phases vary in the literature
[14].
• Concept and definition. Requirements definition
is the generation of technical design constraints
on the system. Some of these will be derived from
information about user demands or expected user
wishes, while others will be there to ensure feasi-
bility of the design. Trade-off studies are carried
out in order to achieve cost-effectiveness and feasi-
bility. Finally, initial life cycle costing studies will
be made.
• Design and development. The system architecture
is specified in detail, hard- and software will be
built, tested and refined, leading where necessary
to adjustments of the specification. Verification
and validation of subsystem integration is car-
ried out: verification ensures that subsystems in-
terfaces conform to design specifications and val-
idation ensures that the integrated systems fulfill
their intended function. Maintainability analysis
will be carried out and end of life disposal will be
considered.
• Manufacturing and installation. Hardware will be
produced and software will be replicated. There is
an emphasis on process control, although further
product verification and validation will take place.
Field trials may be used as a final check on system
performance.
• Operation and maintenance. The system in use
should be monitored for performance. Maintenance
also provides clues as to system performance and
can be adjusted where necessary.
• Disposal. Depending on the regulatory context,
the system may be destroyed, dumped or disman-
tled. Increasingly there is pressure from regula-
tory authorities for reuse of equipment subsys-
tems, so this stage is by no means the end for
the system components.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the
different systems engineering phases. Prior to opera-
tion, reliability estimates forecast true performance
and will encompass the uncertainties in future de-
cisions. As system-specific observations are collated
during development and manufacture, some uncer-
tainties should be resolved and reflected in revised
estimates. This is shown schematically in Figure 2.
Feedback loops exist both within and between pha-
ses, reflecting the analogy with a control system.
Figures 3–6 show more detailed activities with each
flow chart capturing the cyclic nature of the pro-
cess to refine the system design based on assess-
ment against reliability requirements. Information
from subsequent phases should be fed back to ear-
lier phases with a view to modifying the current de-
sign, if required, but also to inform processes and
Fig. 1. Systems engineering phases.
4 T. BEDFORD, J. QUIGLEY AND L. WALLS
Fig. 2. Decreasing uncertainty in future system reliability.
procedures that will impact later generations. How-
ever, feeding data backward is only possible when
the systems engineering phases overlap. Hence much
of the data being fed back is judgemental in nature.
We shall return to these flow charts later when we
discuss issues relating to the role of elicitation.
2.2 Stakeholders in System Design
As mentioned above, these phases are generic and
hence relevant to the markets for consumer, indus-
trial and military systems. However, there may be
differences in the nature of reliability knowledge and
modeling within each market, and we explore this
further through consideration of the key stakehold-
ers with interests in following the reliability assess-
ment of a new system, namely requirements specifi-
cation team, design team, component manufacturer,
lead manufacturer, sellers, regulators, end users, gen-
eral public, maintainers and disposers/recyclers.
These parties can be classed within one of four
groups: client, manufacturer, regulator and public.
These stakeholders can, and often do, take differ-
ent viewpoints about the reliability of the system
and about the relevance of data. For example, Ta-
ble 1 captures the respective roles of the groups
and aims to illustrate two key points. First, that
different stakeholders may have different modeling
intentions with, for example, manufacturers using
models to measure reliability to support decisions
about accommodation of failure modes and improve-
ment activities, while clients may use models to sup-
port negotiation with manufacturers. Second, that
during such negotiations different stakeholders may
be using the same data to support different sides
of a decision. This latter situation mirrors a sim-
ilar situation in probabilistic risk assessment and
indeed areas where different parties are asked to
adopt a common view of uncertainties. This was
Cooke’s motivation for the notion of “rational con-
sensus” [27]. See also the extensive literature on risk
communication and public perceptions, for example,
[54, 127, 128, 133, 136].
3. ELICITATION IN RISK AND RELIABILITY
Subjective expert judgement has a very impor-
tant role to play in assessing uncertainties in the
design process, with many of the stakeholders iden-
tified above contributing their expertise. However,
the emphasis is somewhat different from the role
that expert judgement has in other areas—most no-
tably in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Much
of the modern academic literature on expert judge-
ment has emerged from the need for structured sub-
jective assessments in PRA. The key issues that
emerge from this literature are reviewed.
3.1 Roles within Elicitation
In principle there are three distinct roles:
• Decision-maker : This person is the problem owner,
who is responsible for signing off on a decision and
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Fig. 3. Concept and definition flow chart.
wishes to be informed about relevant uncertain-
ties by appropriate experts.
• Expert : This person is identified as a domain ex-
pert and contributes his or her own assessment on
the events of interest.
• Analyst : This person is responsible for identifying
experts and events of interest, and writing the as-
sessment and combination schemes.
It should be noted that [17] also distinguishes the
role of advisor-expert who essentially plays a role
somewhere between the above players, by support-
ing, for example, the selection of experts and elic-
itation questions. The distinction between roles is
valuable because some schemes do not recognize the
different roles of these players. Bayesian schemes in
particular often merge the role of expert and ana-
lyst by requiring that the analyst play the role of
meta expert, by providing a prior that the expert
data will subsequently update and/or by providing
the likelihood function for the expert data.
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Fig. 4. Detailed design and development flow chart.
A distinction between the three roles defined above
would seem to be important, for example, in pub-
lic sector decision-making where there is a need for
transparency. Even in the private sector there is a
benefit to be gained from transparency and a clear
division of roles. However, it clearly also imposes a
cost burden, for example, due to the degree of spe-
cialism involved, and may therefore be less appro-
priate in some contexts.
3.2 Probability Elicitation Methods and
Processes
Research in experimental psychology has demon-
strated that accurate subjective probabilities are un-
obtainable by simply asking someone to provide a
probability number; therefore an elicitation process
is required [75, 103, 104]. Much of the research in
elicitation is concerned with minimizing bias, which
can result from a variety of causes. Four standard
forms of bias are: motivational, which concerns the
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Fig. 5. Manufacturing and installation flow chart.
situation where the expert has an interest in a par-
ticular value for the parameter being assessed; cog-
nitive, which can result from incoherently basing an
assessment on a number of calculations; anchoring,
which exists when assessments are derived by an ex-
pert from adjusting previous assessments; and avail-
ability, which concerns assigning higher likelihoods
to events that are linked to more memorable histor-
ical events.
Clemen and Winkler [24] gave an overview of the
state of the art with particular emphasis on risk
analysis applications. O’Hagan and co-workers wrote
a series of papers which probably encompass the
most recent generally applicable work on elicitation
[53, 72, 113, 114, 115]. An overview of the uses of
expert judgement in engineering applications was
given by Ayyub [7], although this work covers also
aspects of fuzzy representations (about which the
reader can find a review by Cooke [29] of a previous
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Fig. 6. Operation and maintenance flow chart.
book by Ayyub and a reply by the author). Fitting
closely to the theme of this paper is the work of
Booker and McNamara [17], which presented a very
nice description of the process of determining prob-
lems for expert judgement, selecting experts and the
problems caused by possible biases. Cooke [27] gave
an historical account of elicitation and also provided
a number of different models for the combination of
expert probability assessments, including the classi-
cal method which has been quite successful in PRA
applications; see [76] for a list of applications.
Expert judgement methods that draw on PRA are
relevant to work on engineering design problems but
are limited in two important ways. First, in the engi-
neering design process there is a greater need to have
experts define the problem structure, so the qual-
itative phase of model building is relatively more
important than it has historically been for PRA de-
cision support. See, for example, Walls and Quigley
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Table 1
Stakeholder uses of reliability assessment
Manufacturer Client Regulator and Public
Acceptance of requirements Specification of requirements
Design of reliability program Acceptance of reliability program
Proof of meeting targets Assurance of meeting targets Safety case
Planned maintenance specification Spares ordering
[146], who proposed an elicitation process to support
reliability growth modeling. Second, there is a big
difference in the way that events can be described:
PRA elicitation is generally for very precisely de-
fined events, while in engineering design problems
it is much more difficult to describe events precisely
because of extra uncertainty caused by the effect of
future decision-making that surrounds the system
and its use. In both cases there will always be un-
specified states of the world for which the expert has
to “fold in” his uncertainty. However, the degree of
influence of future decision-making in the reliability
engineering context is such that it becomes useful to
model this explicitly in order to support the design
process.
These concepts are represented in the flow charts
shown in Figures 3–6. For example, in the concept
and definition phase we distinguish between the elic-
itation of the qualitative failure modes and the quan-
titative reliability estimates. Furthermore, sensitiv-
ity analysis represents the exploration of future un-
certainties using engineering judgements as inputs.
In subsequent phases, previous judgements will be
revisited and revised in light of observations from
analysis and test tasks.
3.3 Modeling Uncertainty in Design
While systems engineers may well think in the
holistic framework outlined in Section 2 and cap-
tured within the flow charts in Figures 3–6, the
statistical modeling generally applied is usually fo-
cussed on tightly defined and highly specific issues
within life cycle phases. The support that these tools
give engineers is therefore fairly constrained.
Uncertainty is fundamental to systems modeling
and is worthy of further comment. Various authors
have given overviews of different “types” of uncer-
tainty. The classification given in [10] discusses
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, and suggests that
the important distinction between them is model-
dependent, as epistemic uncertainties are uncertain-
ties that we wish to capture and adjust within a
model through learning, whereas aleatory uncertain-
ties are not adjusted within a model. The uncer-
tainty in an abstract parameter or in a model type
can be given an interpretation, according to [10],
only in terms of the uncertainty it induces in observ-
able outcomes. The above types of uncertainty can
be quantified by subjective probability. By contrast,
[10] mentions ambiguity (which is best resolved by
careful definition during qualitative problem struc-
turing rather than mathematical modeling) and vo-
litional uncertainty (an individual’s own uncertainty
in his own actions), which cannot be measured by
the tools of subjective probability, although it can
be assessed by an independent observer.
In the context of engineering design it seems use-
ful to define another kind of uncertainty—that of
tolerance uncertainty. This represents the variation
expected in a parameter across the design envelope.
For example, one might be interested in the failure
rate (assumed constant) associated with a piece of
equipment. Since that failure rate will depend on
various design, construction, environmental and us-
age factors assumed in the definition of the design
envelope, we can write it as λ(e), where e represents
chosen factors.
Assuming that e is constrained to lie in a de-
sign envelope E, the tolerance uncertainty associ-
ated with λ and E is the interval[
min
e∈E
λ(e),max
e∈E
λ(e)
]
.
It does not always make sense to place a probability
distribution on E. This is because some variables are
subject to choices made by the designer, the manu-
facturer, the user or the maintainer. (At the simplest
level this could be a mandatory rule to the user to
avoid certain conditions that are known to induce
failure.)
System engineering places great emphasis on mak-
ing trade-offs between different aspects of the sys-
tem—cost, functionality, reliability and so forth. From
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a reliability point of view, one of the principal ways
in which this trade is carried out is by changing
the design (which may have cost and/or function-
ality implications), by specifying changes to the de-
sign envelope (i.e., restricting the way in which the
system can be used), by specifying changes to the
maintenance regime or by making changes and mod-
ifications to the system. Since many of these imple-
mentations occur after the design process has been
(notionally) completed, to make the trade-off in the
best way possible it is necessary to know how much
the tolerance uncertainty can be controlled by changes
made later.
4. ELICITATION WITHIN (RELIABILITY)
MODELING PHASES
Reliability models, as is the case with many other
model classes, are developed and applied through
three modeling phases. These phases can occur at
any point within the systems engineering process,
depending on the question at hand. The conceptual
phase is one of model structuring in which a qualita-
tive form is given to the model. That is followed by
an initial quantification stage and then by a revision
stage in which increasing quantities of real system
data can be utilized.
In all three modeling phases there is a role for
expert judgement. In the first, the primary role is in
model selection and initial qualitative specification.
In the second, expert judgement has the key task of
providing the initial quantitative estimates. In the
final phase, expert judgement plays an important
role in interpreting the relevance of available data.
We discuss below the roles that expert judgement
plays in these modeling phases, but first we discuss
frameworks described in the literature that aim to
stretch across both modeling and systems engineer-
ing phases.
4.1 Meta Modeling Frameworks
The programs PREDICT (Performance and Reli-
ability Evaluation with Diverse Information Combi-
nation and Tracking) [83, 84] and REMM (Reliabil-
ity Enhancement Methodology and Modelling) [148]
are two modeling frameworks used to estimate reli-
ability throughout the systems engineering phases.
Both models begin with a problem structuring stage,
which consists of eliciting a graphical representa-
tion of the relationships between relevant engineer-
ing concerns or potential failure modes and the re-
liability experienced by the system. These graphs
form the structure of the stochastic model; this es-
sentially represents a meta model within which stan-
dard probability models can be integrated. The
stochastic model is populated with either expert judge-
ment or relevant historical data. Thus these approaches
provide one unified decision support framework through-
out the system design and development, supporting
sensitivity analysis as well as credible intervals of
the uncertainty in the reliability. Furthermore, as
system-specific data become available through anal-
ysis and test, the model parameters can be updated.
Such frameworks rely on expert judgement for the
reliability assessment at a system level and aim to
overcome the limitations of traditional approaches,
which according to [62] and [73] tend to provide
overly optimistic estimates of reliability due to their
failure to account for major sources of early failures
such as design defects, process flaws and human er-
ror.
We move now to a discussion of the three modeling
stages.
4.2 Qualitative Model Structuring
We distinguish between four types of structuring
activity that play a role within the design and de-
velopment phases: capturing and defining require-
ments, eliciting failure modes, selecting model for-
mulations and robust design.
4.2.1 Requirements capture and concept definition.
Reliability requirements drive the modeling process
as shown in Figure 3 because they inform targets
against which reliability estimates will be compared.
Reliability requirements are expressed in a fairly
standard form in most engineering design projects.
O’Connor [111] provided guidelines of what should
and should not be included. Since reliability require-
ments can drive significant costs, they should be mo-
tivated and ideally derived from user demands about
the system functionality and from an understanding
of what the current technology levels can support.
However, such a derivation requires many assump-
tions about the pattern of use and the environment
in which that will take place.
While it is acknowledged by designers of hard-
ware systems that the customer’s requirements of
the item are of paramount importance [71, 111],
there are few recent published articles compared with
requirements setting for software systems [108]. In
our experience with hardware systems it seems that
systematic modeling is not performed in the deriva-
tion of requirements, and historical precedent (i.e.,
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the requirements that were set for the last version)
is used as an alternative.
A focus of research within the software community
has been the elicitation, analysis and management
of system requirements. Two dominant, but comple-
mentary, methods for analysis are goal oriented [35]
and use case analysis [2]. The former is concerned
with eliciting system constraints, while the latter is
concerned with eliciting system behavior [151]. Pro-
cesses have been proposed to support creative think-
ing about requirements [98] and capture stakeholder
views [32, 39]. Comprehensive rigorous processes for
requirements definition have been suggested, for ex-
ample, in [158] and [6].
A further approach of value in reliability is QFD
[130, 139], which provides a broad-brush, semiquan-
titative assessment of the relationship between those
factors that can be controlled by engineering design
and those characteristics valued by users.
A study of requirements changes throughout a
project is given in [97]. The problem of so-called re-
quirements creep can be endemic, and modeling the
development of requirements throughout a project
is not easy. Within the context of software devel-
opment Stallinger and Gru¨nbacher [137] explored
modeling this with system dynamics; see also [63,
64, 65, 66].
4.2.2 Eliciting failure modes. Qualitative reliabil-
ity modeling is routinely conducted during concept
design to elicit and structure the failure modes that
are likely to drive the (un)reliability. Methods used
include failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
[20], which obtain an understanding of the ways in
which different types of failure can occur, while haz-
ard analysis [85], top-level event tree (ETA) and
fault tree (FTA) analyses [4] can give an indication
of how the system functions. These types of analysis
are prospective and can be extended in later stages
when more information is known about the system.
In contrast, root cause analysis [38] provides a pro-
cess for retrospective forensic analysis of observed
events to identify the drivers so that lessons learnt
can inform use and maintenance of the operational
system; however, such data can also inform design
modifications to a new generation.
Elicitation of subjective judgement plays a pivotal
role in such qualitative analysis with all methods us-
ing some semistructured process to gather and or-
ganize data. For example, FMEA aims to develop
a model of the causes, modes and effects of failures
as they impact the system through different levels
of indenture. Conceptually, FMEA aims to popu-
late an exhaustive sample space of potential events
that could impact reliability from a design or process
perspective. The approach to elicitation is to frame
questions either in terms of functionality, architec-
ture or process and systematically think through
each level in a bottom-up (i.e., from parts to sys-
tem) manner. In contrast, FTA assumes a top-down
approach to elicitation. Critical events, or so-called
top events, are defined in terms of departures from
requirements. For any system there may be one or
more top events. For each, a tree is constructed by
drilling down the sequence of events that could cause
or exacerbate a failure. Fault trees can accommo-
date failures with more than one cause, while FMEA
cannot. Hazard analysis represents a structured elic-
itation of potential operational hazards to a system
during installation, production and decommission-
ing using a set of prescribed keywords to manage
the content analysis.
The principles of the aforementioned approaches
aspire to be systematic; however, there has been crit-
icism of their reported implementation. The FMEA
has been criticized within the aerospace industry
[100] because it has been implemented too late in the
product development process and in a manner that
does not allow information to be fed back to inform
the product design. White [153] criticized the gen-
eral approach to use of the suite of standard meth-
ods, claiming the manner of their use is reductionist,
and proposed that a systems approach that exploits
multiple partial views and explores the problem en-
vironment would result in richer information.
It is not known how valid these criticisms are for
all industries. There is evidence that these methods
are being used effectively to influence system de-
sign of, for example, space systems [52], but there
is undoubtedly a lack of reporting in the literature
by manufacturers and there is no known scientific
survey of the effectiveness and efficiency of their
application. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there
are industry effects, for example, consumer products
that embrace elicitation of failure modes as part of
their quality processes [33, 119] while others largely
remain accountants of failure modes.
Recent research related to these qualitative meth-
ods has been dominated by two avenues: (1) au-
tomation of knowledge capture and representation
[93] and (2) quantitative prioritization rules [21] and
computational algorithms [5, 43]. An exception has
12 T. BEDFORD, J. QUIGLEY AND L. WALLS
been the work described in [17, 62, 83, 84, 147,
148] which developed elicitation processes that em-
brace a systems approach and the scientific prin-
ciples of structured judgement [27] fundamental to
sound data collection. They aim to elicit the core
concerns held by all relevant stakeholders during
early design through a sequence of semistructured
interviews using simple mapping [41]. Discussions
are triggered by focussing on the changes between
generations of systems designs in terms of technol-
ogy, process and use. The maps developed capture
the reasoning trail that links to formal records within
a defined failure taxonomy [50] that can be revisited
and updated as the design evolves. This approach
is captured within Figures 3–6 through the initial
activity to elicit failure modes in early design and
subsequent elicitation exercises in later phases.
4.2.3 Selecting and structuring models. Surpris-
ingly little has been written about the qualitative
structuring process for reliability models. At a prac-
titioner level, guidance on the selection of tools to
match modeling objectives exists within international
and company standards. At a more abstract level,
the principles of requisite modeling can be applied
[120, 121, 123].
The standard systems reliability models are all
based essentially on cause and effect, and include
FTA, ETA, reliability block diagrams (RBD) and
(semi) Markov modeling [16, 126]. These methods
provide subtly different, but related, representations
of the system. Typically used in a hierarchical way,
they can be used at different levels of system inden-
ture, enabling the reliability engineer to fill in more
detail, as it becomes known. Keller and Modarres
[81] provided details of their early history. See also
[31, 99, 143].
There is often a perception that there exist “cor-
rect” models which can be found by the applica-
tion of appropriate quality control. However, there
are important choices to be made about the model
scope. How deep (or detailed) should the model be?
What failure events should be considered? Which
environments, or failure scenarios, should be con-
sidered? These questions are the subject of expert
judgement, albeit usually unstructured.
Graphical based methods such as FTA and RBD
are popular during design because they provide use-
ful representations of the system, linking probabilis-
tic assessments with physical structure and func-
tionality. However, the frameworks are not without
shortcomings and recent research has proposed the
use of Bayesian belief networks (BBN) as a more
flexible substitute [134]. The BBNs can be constructed
to directly map onto potential engineering decisions
[11]; they can be constructed to capture temporal
effects [18]; they can capture common cause failure
modes [140]; they can capture anticipated changes
in reliability due to manufacturing and operational
demands [152]; and, finally, BBNs can be used to fa-
cilitate decision-making subject to multiple criteria
[47]. This is important during concept design when
the strengths and weaknesses of design options are
traded off. Several case studies describe the appli-
cation of BBNs to reliability modeling of complex
systems. See, for example, [19, 46, 107, 159]. Leish-
man and McNamara [94] described an ethnographic
approach to qualitatively structuring a reliability
model. Such an approach makes use of in-depth in-
terviews with relevant participants. The data ac-
quired through the interviewing processes are struc-
tured via Bayesian networks; see also [155].
4.2.4 Robust design. The stress–strength relation-
ship is core to reliability engineering. Conventional
modelling, as discussed above, provides estimates of
whether the system design possesses the strength to
meet the nominal stresses within the specified oper-
ational environment. However, there can be consid-
erable uncertainty about the actual stresses encoun-
tered in operation and, hence, analysis to examine
the robustness of the design to variation in stresses
is important.
The concept of robust design [116] is fundamen-
tal to the quality movement and encompasses the
work on experimental design and analysis. Condra
[25], among others, defines reliability as “quality
through time” and advocates the importance of sta-
tistical experimental design in reliability improve-
ment. There are limited reports of its use in prac-
tical reliability engineering, although see, for exam-
ple, [33] for its use within the automotive industry.
Perhaps this is not too surprising since the ability
to replicate repeated trials is most feasible for those
systems which will be mass produced. Others have
discounted the influence of experimental design on
traditional reliability testing because of the identifi-
ability problems given the small amount of data rel-
ative to control parameters [79]. The increasing role
of simulated experiments may remove such physical
constraints.
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Elicitation is required to support not only design
of experiments, but also specification of standard re-
liability tests, such as growth development tests and
production acceptance tests. Again there is little re-
ported about how this can and should be achieved.
Exceptions are Condra [25] and Davis [33], who share
insight into the identification of the failure modes
that influence the choice of response variable and
the semistructured methods used to identify the ex-
planatory variables and their experimental settings.
Methods for elicitation of stakeholder judgements
abound in the quality literature. A useful summary
is given in [78], which summarizes 100 methods by
purpose, when to use, how to use and benefits, and
provides an example. The methods are classified into:
management methods, analytical methods, idea gen-
eration, data collection, analysis and display. While
the scope is comprehensive, all tools are treated as
independent entities.
A recent special issue of the journal Quality and
Reliability Engineering International (April 2005)
provided some interesting reviews of the role of six
sigma in the 21st century and the key interaction
between the softer and harder aspects of statisti-
cal modeling within industry. Hahn [60] emphasized
the key goal of designing products with long life and
high reliability, and identified the need to include re-
liability modeling within the six sigma toolkit. The
use of six sigma through the life cycle of an auto-
mated decision support system is discussed in [117],
again highlighting the synergies with systems engi-
neering, although broadening the issues beyond the
engineering to include service processes. Anderson-
Cook, Patterson and Hoerl [3] described graduate
training with special emphasis on the role of struc-
tured problem solving within a program that aims to
develop the facilitation skills of statisticians within
a project life cycle.
Experiments, tests and statistical quality control
are encompassed by the generic term “task” used
in Figures 3–5. We propose that their value should
be assessed during reliability planning and the data
from their implementation should be used to revise
modeling estimates, which we shall discuss further
later.
4.3 Initial Quantification
Most of the key probabilistic models used in re-
liability are quantified through mixtures of expert
judgement and generic, or other, surrogate data.
4.3.1 Reliability models. Before discussing the var-
ious techniques used for quantification, we give a
brief overview of some of the models used, arranged
according to the systems engineering phases. Note,
however, that there is no rigid restriction of mod-
els to the phases we have associated them with,
as preliminary studies are frequently carried out in
earlier phases and detailed later. For example, de-
cisions about production, maintenance and opera-
tional support will tend to be made in development
using information about the failure modes elicited in
design. In turn, tasks included in the reliability plan
and used to revise estimates after implementation
include the engineering analysis and test methods
discussed below.
Design and development. Concept design is char-
acterized by the need to make trade-off decisions:
cost against functionality, weight against strength
and so on. In principle reliability requirements should
play a part in these trade-offs too, with model pre-
dictions being inputs to the game. However, although
there is a wide literature on reliability optimization
(see [91] for a survey), this literature generally makes
the assumption that the system structure and the
reliability characteristics of parts are quite well de-
fined. This is not usually the case within early de-
sign: hence, the difficulties of predicting future reli-
ability quantitatively are such that reliability tends
not to play a major role in the trade-off discussion
[14].
In addition to the systems reliability models listed
in Section 4.2.3 and widely used in practice, many
probability models have been reported in the liter-
ature. For example, Singpurwalla [135] provided a
taxonomy of stochastic models that are useful for
reliability modeling in dynamic environments. This
is important because not only are there uncertain-
ties in the operational stresses under given condi-
tions, but there can be anticipated variation on the
demand patterns. Renewal processes are commonly
used [8], although other people adapt FTA to cap-
ture a dynamic environment [1].
Physical failure modeling is used extensively within
simulation during detailed design and development.
Mathewson et al. [101] provided a review of simula-
tion tools used within the design process for predic-
tive inference as well as for supporting optimal de-
sign decisions. The majority of these models make
extensive use of component level physical models
which are adjusted by empirical data for calibra-
tion. The main criticism of these models is limited
focus of one failure mechanism per model [13].
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Engineering testing remains a staple part of re-
liability programs, but growth testing is now more
prevalent than demonstration testing. Many tests
will be conducted under accelerated conditions (see
[109, 110] for a bibliography of accelerated test plans)
and they generate few observations. Consequently,
research in this field is dominated by Bayesian ap-
proaches; see [44, 58, 77, 124, 125]. A notable excep-
tion is modeling with covariates [40].
Within civil engineering, expert judgement is now
commonly used to incorporate assessments of un-
certainties into design decision-making. In this area
much of the design decision-making is in the context
of the management and upgrading of existing assets.
See [34] for a discussion of a performance-based as-
set management system for flood defenses which is
driven by expert judgements. The Dutch are going
through a process of reevaluating their risk crite-
ria for dikes, and much of the technical preparatory
work has involved the use of expert judgement to as-
sess uncertainties in the physical models of dike fail-
ure [30, 145]. Similarly, expert judgement has been
used to quantify physical models that describe the
behavior of buildings [36].
Manufacture and installation. There are a few
unique systems where active design continues into
manufacturing—mainly in space systems and civil
engineering structures. However, for most systems,
the emphasis in the manufacturing phase is on pro-
duction quality control. For mass production, estab-
lished methods of statistical process control can be
used for the key failure modes elicited during de-
sign and development. Systems with a low volume
of assembly and many manual processes may rely on
product screening [67]. For such systems, which in-
clude aerospace and military systems, early produc-
tion models can also be used in prerelease testing
to give either the manufacturer or the client confi-
dence in the reliability of the product. The design
and analysis of these trials possess the same data
challenges as reliability demonstration tests earlier
in development.
Operation and maintenance. Several authors have
acknowledged the role of expert judgement within
maintenance modeling, notably, Lu, Wang and Chris-
ter [96], who combined subjective judgement about
preventive maintenance with failure records to sup-
port delay time modeling of plants, and Kunttu and
Kortelainen [90], who presented a case study using
expert judgement within a Poisson model to sup-
port maintenance decisions. van Noortwijk et al.
[142] proposed a maintenance optimization model
and used a linear pool to combine expert opinion to
assess the lifetime distribution. See also [149] for a
review of subjective estimation in maintenance mod-
eling.
Murthy, Solem and Roren [106] provided a com-
prehensive review of warranty modeling, and Kleyner
and Sandborn [86] provided a warranty model based
on Weibull and exponential models where the pa-
rameters are estimated by data using stochastic sim-
ulation to overcome mathematical intractability. Ward
and Christer [150] acknowledged the need for ex-
pert assessment for warranty modeling. Examples
of Bayesian approaches include [68, 122, 138].
Real-time condition monitoring is an important
tool in maintenance decision-making. When mod-
eled, a degradation signal can be used to estimate
residual life. The data obtained through measur-
ing aspects of the degradation process of each of
the system’s components can be used as concomi-
tant variables in a proportional hazards model [144].
Alternative approaches include [87], which uses a
Markov chain to capture the degradation process.
The usefulness of engineering judgement for inter-
preting such data is evident and, as such, Bayesian
methods potentially play an important role in this
part of the cycle (see, e.g., [55]).
A variety of problems are associated with civil
engineering structures during the operations phase.
Assessments of the times required to evacuate a dike
ring are made in [9], while the time required to safely
close the movable barriers in a dike ring structure
is modeled in [141]. Degradation process modeling
is very important, particularly where inspection or
condition monitoring may be costly, such as with
sewers [88], or where the underlying processes are
difficult to predict, such as with coastal erosion [61].
4.3.2 Expert judgement collection. All of the above
models require instantiation. Typically they are quan-
tified through expert judgement using a similar set
of techniques that we now discuss.
The initial quantification of reliability models is,
in practice, frequently an unstructured search through
historical systems data and generic data bases to
find “ball park” parameter estimates.
A variety of problems are encountered here:
• The combination of opinions of different experts.
• The transformation of combined data into assess-
ments of parameters within a model.
• The combination of expert and generic system
data.
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4.3.3 Expert combination. When more than one
expert is contributing assessments about a quantity
of interest, then the analyst has the problem of com-
bining them in some way. There are, broadly, two
approaches to this. The first is to pool the data—
generally through the use of a linear pool. The sec-
ond is to regard the expert assessments as observa-
tions and use a Bayesian model to combine them.
An even simpler and older method is that of paired
comparisons (see the discussion in [27]).
Pooling. Key issues of consideration with pool-
ing schemes concern choosing which properties to
preserve as we switch between the individual ex-
perts and the aggregated pooled expert. For exam-
ple, assessments which are statistically independent
for individuals are not necessarily independent for
the pooled expert and updating the pooled expert
through Bayes’ theorem does not necessarily provide
the same distribution as aggregating all the updated
individual distributions (see, e.g., [56] or [45]).
We refer to Cooke [27] for a discussion of the dif-
ferent types of pooling, but note that he argued
strongly for a linear pooling of expert distributions.
Each expert is assigned a weight which is used to
form a weighted combination of expert distributions.
The weight should not be interpreted as a proba-
bility, as one cannot associate the experts with a
collection of exclusive and exhaustive events. The
choice of weight is difficult to justify. While a com-
mon pragmatic approach is to use equal weightings
of experts (see the description of NUREG 1150 given
in [80]), Cooke has argued that performance-based
weighting is more effective and better meets impor-
tant underlying principles including empirical con-
trol. For more details see [10, 27], and for a moment-
based approach see [156].
Bayesian combination. The main difference in phi-
losophy between pooling and Bayesian combination
is that the latter treats expert assessments as if they
are observations. Hence there has to be a specifica-
tion of the likelihood function of the expert data.
This feature, which raises serious problems for the
analyst, is most clearly visible in the multivariate
normal model used by Mosleh and Apostolakis [105].
Here the expert assessment is modeled as being equal
to the “true” value of the parameter of interest, plus
a normally distributed error, which is considered to
be independent of the true value. In principle, the
analyst then has to specify the multivariate distri-
bution of expert errors: means (which can be inter-
preted as expert biases), variances (which can be
interpreted as degree of certainty) and covariances
(which reflect the degree of correlation of the group
of experts). While these are all quantities of some
interest in assessing expert opinions, it is not clear
on what basis the analyst can assess them without
being in a superior position of expertise to that of
the experts.
There are now many other Bayesian methods avail-
able, especially techniques that incorporate Bayesian
networks, which have essentially the same require-
ment that the analyst develop a likelihood function
for expert data. See [24] for a discussion of a variety
of such models. The difficulty of structuring such a
model depends of course on the details of the model
and the context in which it is used. For example, see
[129], which takes assessments of numbers of failures
to assess parameters of a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process, and [57], which discusses the possible ad-
vantages of a Bayes linear framework.
4.3.4 Transformation to parameters and families
of distributions. Both theoreticians and practition-
ers can easily forget that many of our favorite model
parameters, such as failure rate, are not actually ob-
servable quantities at all, but are simply parameters
of a model that we want to use to make predictions
about the future. It has been strongly argued on
foundational grounds (e.g., the discussion in Chap-
ter 2 of [10]) that we can only ask for probability
assessments on observable quantities. Hence there is
a need to infer from those assessments which prob-
ability distributions on model parameters are con-
sistent. This approach was developed by Cooke [28];
more algorithms and underlying theory are given in
[89].
Taking a more standard Bayesian perspective,
Percy [118] discussed the indirect assessment of hy-
perprior parameters through the direct assessment
of quantiles of observables whose distribution is a
prior predictive of the unknown Bayesian model.
Gutierrez-Pulido, Aguirre-Torres and Christen [59]
took a similar line, considering both moments and
quantiles of the time to failure for a system as sources
of information from which prior distributions can
be fitted. Such methods could also be applicable to
other Bayesian contexts where prior distributions on
lifetime distribution parameters are to be assessed,
for example, in Bayesian accelerated or proportional
hazards life modeling [22].
In the absence of an assumed class of conditional
models it becomes much more difficult to assess a
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family of conditional distributions: in the context of
decision support, it is necessary to consider families
of distributions indexed by the decision variables.
When the decision space is small and discrete, re-
peated elicitation can be used, but in the case of a
continuous family this becomes more difficult. We
are not aware of much work in this area, but it is
worth mentioning work by Cooke and Jager, who
expressed the probability of an event in terms of sys-
tem parameters in a Taylor series [26]. A study by
Willems et al. [154] used graphical methods to elicit
conditional quantiles from experts. In the context
of human reliability analysis, proportional hazards
type models have been used in which the parame-
ters are assessed purely through various judgemental
techniques, such as paired comparison or multicrite-
ria decision analysis. See [42] in particular and the
discussion in [10] for other examples.
4.3.5 The combination of expert and historical data.
Heritage data for historical systems provide insights
into the observed reliability of related systems. See,
for example, Figure 3, which highlights the selection
of historical data to inform the base reliability of the
new system.
Historical data may be obtained from generic data
bases or company-specific event data bases. Generic
reliability data are usually based on operating data
drawn from a variety of sources and mixed together.
Many generic databases exist; usually they are sector-
specific. To adapt such generic information to a
system-specific setting, reliability data bases have
traditionally used environmental loading factors, such
as the Military Handbook 217 [37] (hereafter Mil-
Hdbk-217).
Mil-Hdbk-217 expresses failure rates for compo-
nents using so-called “pi” factors, which are multi-
plication factors that depend on environmental or
usage factors. To determine the appropriate failure
rate, the analyst simply has to find the correct com-
ponent description, identify the appropriate envi-
ronmental or usage factors and then multiply the
base failure rate by the pi factors given in the ta-
ble. These numbers are given to a very high degree
of accuracy and are an attempt to represent the
dependence of reliability on at least some param-
eters. Unfortunately, because they do not represent
the dependence on all the parameters, the accuracy
given is misleading. By contrast, the IEEE-500 data
base and others based on similar principles, such
as OREDA and EIREDA, specify much about the
system and its operating conditions, but explicitly
present the remaining variability in the failure rates.
Fragola [50] called these resources “third generation
databases.”
Many reliability “predictions” made in practical
applications seem to be based on an adaptation of
generic data through expert opinion, rather than
from a (possibly Bayesian-based) fusion of the two
forms of data. For example, in practice it is common
to adjust generic data to make it system-specific—
typically through the use of failure rate multipli-
cation factors—but the methods employed are not
generally supported by clear and transparent expert
judgement protocols or models.
A nice example of failure rate adjustment is given
by Fragola and McFadden’s study of failure rates
for space station units [51], where experts gather
and combine different generic data estimates. While
no clear statistical model is used to justify this, it
is worth noting that the outputs of the process are
ranges of failure rates. The third generation databases
described above all provide ranges of failure rates—
often described using a log-normal distribution on
the failure rate parameter. About the point esti-
mates given to great precision in Mil-Hdbk-217 data,
Fragola [50] wrote, “. . . failure rates came to be looked
upon as fixed measures of specific equipment, not
measures of a spectrum of equipment types.” How-
ever, he suggested also that Mil-Hdbk-217 data are
perfectly usable, as long as they are used in conjunc-
tion with uncertainty bands to capture this extra
variation.
One of the underlying reasons for the overstated
accuracy of Mil-Hdbk-217 is that it reflects a large
amount of testing; this is worth reflecting on further,
because it has more general implications for the re-
lationship of old to new system data, and for the
way data changes through the systems engineering
process. Old data will often be a poor representation
of prior information because they do not take into
account the changes made to the system, usage and
environment. Although the usual asymptotic con-
vergence properties hold when updating with the
new system data, this is of little practical signifi-
cance because the amount of new system experience
needed for convergence is not available. Hence the
speed at which the posteriors will adjust to the “cor-
rect” failure rate will be affected by the degree of cer-
tainty we had built up for the previous system: The
more data we had for the previous system, the more
slowly the posterior will converge to the correct new
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failure rate. A more appropriate way to model the
new system reliability is to try to model the change
expected to the old system reliability, and this is
something that can only be assessed through expert
judgement. Often the uncertainty about the effect of
the change will dominate the information from the
old prior.
The REMM model [148] explicitly attempts to
model such effects by considering failure modes in
the new and existing systems and subjective assess-
ments about the way the design changes will affect
them. A higher level approach using Bayes linear
methods (based on moments rather than probabili-
ties) was discussed in [57], where expert assessment
of the change to MTBF (mean time before failure)
is proposed.
Using historical data from company-specific data
bases can give rise to similar issues already men-
tioned for generic data. Although data for the pre-
vious systems manufactured by the company have
the potential to relate operating experience directly
to earlier design decisions, hence supporting inter-
pretation and selection of base events input to the
reliability model for the new system, there are also
industry-specific challenges, for example, censoring
at the expiry of the warranty period for consumer
products [33].
The common problem with using old system data,
whatever their source, can be expressed succinctly
using the notation for system reliability used earlier,
r = r(d, p,u,m, c).
Suppose the old system data correspond to slightly
different design, production, usage and maintenance
patterns. Then the “old” reliability will be
r= r(do, po, uo,mo, co).
The uncertainty ranges given in the third genera-
tion data bases may be seen as an attempt to rep-
resent credible ranges by changing these parameters
within a given envelope. It is finally worth remark-
ing that it is essential for the future utility of these
data bases that they maintain the ranges inherent
in each equipment class. Hence it would be wrong to
start updating the data bases with system-specific
data using a straightforward application of Bayes’
theorem, as this will reduce the variance artificially.
4.4 Revised Quantification with
System-Specific Data
Because data are realized from tasks implemented
in design, development and manufacture, the initial
reliability estimate can be revised as captured in
Figures 3–6. We discuss the two options for revision
of estimates: Bayesian updating and reelicitation.
As noted above, badly calibrated prior distribu-
tions and poorly specified stochastic models com-
promise Bayesian inference. The quality of inference
obtained through Bayesian updating is contingent
on both the prior distribution to capture epistemic
uncertainty and the choice of model to capture the
aleatory uncertainty. The latter of these acts like a
lens in which the data are viewed, so even if a mean-
ingful prior distribution is elicited, the posterior dis-
tribution may be misleading because this lens may
filter out observations that would sensibly inform
the inference if the choice of model were different.
As such, differences in reelicited prior distributions
compared with posterior distributions may be due
to the filtering rather than incoherency expert(s) or
may be due to a mixture of both.
The systems engineering process is longitudinal
and hence offers the opportunity, not only to update
prior distributions through Bayes’ theorem, but also
to reelicit from a common set of experts. This offers
the opportunity to validate the choice of model, as
well as to assess the calibration of the prior distri-
butions. Furthermore, a learning environment can
be created by appropriately feeding results back to
the experts and supporting them in improving their
ability to specify uncertainty in terms of probability.
As discussed earlier, the quality of subjective prob-
abilities from experts depends on both the elici-
tation methods and the experts’ experience. If an
expert lacks experience, prior distributions will be
uninformative or misleading, regardless of the elici-
tation method. Equally, poorly designed elicitation
processes may degrade the quality of information
provided from experts. Fischhoff [49] proposed the
following four necessary conditions to support im-
proving judgement skills: (1) Abundant practice with
a set of reasonably homogeneous tasks; (2) clear-
cut criterion events for outcome feedback; (3) task-
specific reinforcement; (4) explicit admission of the
need for learning. There is extensive evidence that
these criteria are often not achieved in practice [48,
157].
Feedback is crucial for calibrating the expert and
should be event-specific [48, 49, 157]. In other words,
18 T. BEDFORD, J. QUIGLEY AND L. WALLS
the feedback must be given with respect to assign-
ing probabilities to particular events and not to the
ability of the expert to assign probabilities to any
situation. To increase the effectiveness of feedback in
terms of learning, conditions that influence the event
should recur as often as possible [49, 74]. There-
fore the factors on which the measure is conditioned
should be as few and as general as possible.
5. DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS ON
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have attempted to give an overview of expert
judgement applications within the field of reliabil-
ity assessment during systems design. In doing so,
a number of key points have arisen which we now
revisit to summarize and discuss further.
We have suggested that the whole systems en-
gineering design process is akin to a control prob-
lem. The control feedback loops are, however, driven
largely not through revisiting decisions in the light
of newly acquired system data, but through the use
of expert judgements which assess the likely out-
come of different system design decisions. Of course,
in the wider context of new generations of systems,
there are also feedback loops through the use of rel-
evant data that reduce uncertainty not only on the
system’s own physical and engineering properties,
but also on the manner of user interaction. It is also
worth mentioning that requirements are frequently
revised in light of experience with previous genera-
tions of systems, and there is surely a role for statis-
ticians in influencing the setting of such targets. In
fact, with the increasing use of sensors that are able
to record all sorts of aspects of system performance,
environment and use, the opportunities for statisti-
cal modeling of these aspects are greater than ever.
Given that systems engineering stresses the im-
portance of making trade-off decisions, we remarked
that the reliability information required to support
such decisions is—expressed abstractly—the depen-
dence of the reliability metric
r= r(d, p,u,m, c)
in terms of d, p,u,m and c, the choices made for de-
sign, production, usage, maintenance and changes.
While defining such a function precisely would be
impractical, we feel that this at least provides a con-
ceptual model for the direction statisticians should
be taking. Reliability optimization models, reliabil-
ity growth models and other such models are all
techniques used to provide partial approximations
to this function.
The fact that some decisions are made later in
the design process means that models are sometimes
used in ways that are uncomfortable to statisticians
and mathematicians: For example, the use of a con-
stant failure rate lifetime model (exponential dis-
tribution) for computations early in the process and
the later use of increasing failure rate models for the
same system to help determine maintenance inter-
vals may seem contradictory, but if the first model
was applied with the knowledge that the mainte-
nance intervals would be fixed post hoc to ensure
that the failure rate is roughly constant, then there
is no problem. This is a small illustration of the way
the flexibility endowed by future decisions can en-
sure appropriateness of modeling tools post hoc.
Many of the elicitation techniques applied within
engineering design have crossed over from the prob-
abilistic risk analysis area. Despite the many sim-
ilarities with this area, there are a few key differ-
ences. One is that many uncertainties will be af-
fected in some way by future design decisions, so an
understanding of dependence on design parameters
is critical. Another critical aspect is that the design
process is one of learning for the engineers. Hence
the designers’ insights change throughout the pro-
cess and there is thus a need for problem and model
structuring techniques to be applied: the qualita-
tive structuring of statistical models has to be tied
closely to the design development process.
Two reliability modeling frameworks have been
described that try to extend the scope of reliability
techniques from “small world” problems to provide
guidance over a wider range of problems. We noted
also, however, that a holistic “whole life modeling”
approach would need to be attractive to the differ-
ent stakeholders associated to the system and that
there is a need to provide a rational consensus across
these parties about the uncertainties faced. Tech-
niques developed in the PRA setting may be adapt-
able to this situation, and integration with usual
systems engineering approaches appears to be nat-
ural.
This brings us to some observations on the foun-
dational aspects of reliability modeling in this area,
because on the one hand, the methods are largely
subjective, but on the other hand, there is a recog-
nition of the limitations of Bayesian techniques. One
such limitation is the need to establish rational con-
sensus (as noted above) to break down the some-
times adversarial relationship encountered between
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stakeholders. Another is that the nature of learning
in engineering design is that new modeling needs are
continually emerging and model structures—with
corresponding likelihood functions—need to be ad-
justed to match.
Engineering design is an area of great interest for
statisticians, but involvement in this area requires
some changes in mindset. Reliability is one of the
many requirements that the designer is trying to
juggle. Hence supporting the design process has to
be done by giving insights into what is feasible. All
decisions can be modulated later in the process as
long as there is a feasible set of solutions: failure of
the design process occurs when decisions taken ear-
lier imply that the set of feasible solutions is empty.
Historically, many reliability techniques have been
applied too little or too late in the design process to
inform it properly and some practitioners, such as
O’Connor [112], have been critical of statistical re-
liability work, seeing it as a numbers game, but the
increased use of expert judgement combined with
more rapid information distribution through infor-
mation technology systems gives real opportunities
to “raise the game” as far as the impact of reliabil-
ity is concerned. We have identified a whole set of
problems in which there is scope for statisticians and
operations researchers to play a role in developing
new elicitation methods and modeling tools within
the systems engineering design process. Surely, as we
get more deeply involved in such areas, the insights
into uncertainty elicitation will provide benefits for
other application areas too. Although we would not
go as far as Lindley’s colleague in claiming “there are
no problems left in statistics except the assessment
of probability” [95], it is undeniably the case that
expert judgement methods dramatically increase the
scope for statistical work in engineering design prob-
lems and that work in that area provides us with a
new range of contexts within which new elicitation
methods can be developed.
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